Hungary elects
Not so rosy situation
After another four years, in 2026 Hungarians will go to the ballot box to cast their votes. It is fair to say that, in 20 years, this is the first election that feels like it has a real possibility of upsetting the current ruling party, Fidesz, which has governed the country for 16 years with an absolute majority in the parliament. This power, combined with an economic tailwind in the 2010s and an unimaginable amount of EU funds, has led to Hungary lagging behind Poland and a couple of other EU members, settling in one of the last three places in the bloc depending on the ranking. Undoubtedly, the question is…what went wrong?
In short, the Hungarian government committed all the necessary mistakes to land in the middle‑income trap. First, it slowly began to centralize and underfund education, which put almost all universities into dire financial situations, removed any freedom and creativity, and focused almost solely on theoretical knowledge. The result? Hungarian students have performed worse and worse in international tests, proving that they are ill‑equipped to navigate a world that increasingly requires more critical‑thinking, problem‑solving skills, and creativity.
Then, the main economic policy was to attract foreign companies with heavy subsidies to build plants, lately such as BMW, BYD, Samsung, and CATL. The problem is that only a fraction of the created jobs carry high added value. This model worked as long as there were large reserves of workers thanks to the high unemployment rate and relatively low wages after the 2008 financial crisis. But now, as wages have risen to a certain level and the job market has tightened, the Hungarian economy has hit a ceiling with the current structure.
Combined with an enormous structural deficit — around 5% over the past five years due to expansive welfare policies — the way out seems even harder than before, even if the government had the incentive to change.
Hungarian society
I believe the happenings of the last 30 years — since Hungary became a democracy in 1989 — can be explained by the folk spirit. Thanks to generations growing up in socialism, which provided relative stability and a certain level of well‑being compared to other countries in the bloc, Hungarians still have fond memories of those times, unlike Romanians. Combined with the fact that there was no real chance to climb the social ladder, as everyone was formally equal, there emerged a notion that it is the government’s role to provide for the people and that they do not have the capability or the opportunity to change their lives by themselves.
After the shock of 2008, I think Viktor Orbán found the way to become the new father figure the nation really needed and, in a sense, missed, after eight long years in the opposition. He began to use nationalistic rhetoric that resonated deeply with people, and he distributed more and more “free” money in the form of extra pensions, tax cuts, and housing support. But with the COVID‑19 crisis and the deteriorating economic environment, this recipe started to break down after 2022, which led to the unlikely rise of the opposition from the least expected place.
Potential challenger
The current challenger, Péter Magyar, became known in early 2024 after suddenly taking a stance when a scandal erupted around the then president, Katalin Novák, who had pardoned someone convicted of helping to cover up child abuse. He gained a lot of sympathy as he also began to raise his voice on other important matters, such as the state of education, healthcare, and society in general. Fast‑forwarding two years, he was able to withstand the uneven playing field and the false attacks by state media and even take the lead by about 5% around two months before the election. Some of his success can be attributed to turning Orbán’s nationalist playbook against himself, as it has become increasingly hard to defend the failing public services after 16 years of power. Magyar probably learned from the best, since he was once part of the inner circle as the husband of the then minister of justice, who also resigned after the scandal.
Their worldview in general is not that different in many ways, as both of them can be placed on the right side of the political spectrum, albeit that Tisza leans more toward the center. This would be the part where I compare the party programs, but Fidesz has not really put any effort into creating one, aside from the usual “we will continue what we started and we will defend Hungarian families.” Anyway, if we look at Tisza’s program, there is nothing out of the ordinary. They mainly focused on and highlighted things that are visibly broken in the country at the moment and how they plan to fix them:
Seek the release of billions of euros worth of EU funding currently suspended and use those released funds to invest in healthcare, transport, education and support for businesses.
Clamp down on corruption and cut back on what it calls unjustified public investments.
Raise healthcare spending each year until it reaches 7% of GDP by 2030.
Limit state intervention in the economy and markets (currently there are price limits on food prices and extra profit taxes on different sectors)
Cut the budget deficit from 5% or more of gross domestic product this year to below 3% and to meet euro entry criteria by 2030
Strengthen Hungary’s European and Western orientation.
Eliminate dependence on Russian energy by 2035.
They wisely avoid saying or stating anything overly controversial, even if they are planning to do something or believe it is right, as it can easily be misinterpreted and used for propaganda purposes by the government media. It is also smart of them that they have highlighted their intention to keep many current tax breaks, such as the rule that mothers are tax‑free for life if they have at least two children, keeping the 13th and 14th pension, and even cutting taxes on wages below the median, somewhat to assure Hungarians that they will also be “givers.” On the other hand, I am not that optimistic that all these promises and policies can be kept, as Hungary has been running a huge deficit for a while and many areas are critically underfunded. Probably they know it too.
Bigger picture
If we zoom out, I think it is worth examining the place of Hungary on the international stage, despite its relative insignificance given its size. Despite that, Hungary has received a lot more media attention in the last couple of years, thanks to an unorthodox anti‑EU, pro‑Russia, and pro‑China stance and, lately, a pro‑US one too, following Trump’s re‑election.
This has led to a peculiar position where Hungary seems stranded in the middle. The government has become increasingly isolated within the EU, aside from Slovakia and a few other non‑governing right‑wing parties, while Russia, China, and the US do not treat Viktor Orbán as an equal, but more like a "puppet" who helps advance their agendas. Russia uses Hungary as a proxy to disrupt the EU's unified stance on the war in Ukraine and on Russian matters more broadly. China's incentives are mostly economic. It helped finance the Budapest–Belgrade railway line within the Belt and Road Initiative, which can be described as one of the worst infrastructure investments in recent memory. Based on numerous calculations, the project will need at least 100 years to break even. Realistically more, while utilization is expected to remain low, with only two passenger trains and one freight train per hour. The real winners are the Chinese here, who has a clear railway line from Piraeus to Budapest. Hungary has also provided generous grants to Chinese battery and EV manufacturers, with the clear winners being the companies themselves, as they can effectively circumvent EU tariffs on EVs built in China.
Péter Magyar would inherit a messy international‑relations landscape, but not an impossible one. He has highlighted during his campaign that one of his main goals will be to rebuild relations with the West and the EU, and to strengthen Hungary's commitment to the bloc. This would benefit both sides. A more unified EU would be better equipped to face a rapidly changing world. The early signs are promising, as he already had a couple meetings with western politicians.
Despite the change in direction, Tisza will still have its reservations. The party plans to take a more conservative approach toward EU migration policy and toward Ukraine's fast‑tracked accession. In general, I think having critical minds willing to cooperate in order to reach solutions is very much needed, as the current bureaucratic decision‑making is slowly weakening the EU from within.
Tisza has also renewed its interest in adopting the euro and meeting the Maastricht Convergence Criteria by 2030, which could strengthen the EU politically and also economically too. The most challenging part will be reducing the public‑debt‑to‑GDP ratio from the current around 74% to below 60% and keeping it there. I am not sure about the feasibility of achieving that by the end of the upcoming parliamentary term. A target around 2034 could prove more realistic and sustainable.
If the current regime stays in power — whether with an absolute majority or not — the distancing from the EU will likely continue, and questions may arise about whether Hungary still has a clear place in the bloc. Despite that, I do not expect direct steps toward an exit, as Hungary is heavily dependent on the EU, especially on the German economy, while the majority of the population still views membership as a net positive.
Conclusion
It is fair to say that the stakes are high, as the two parties paint two very different futures for the country. That said, I think if no clear winner can emerge with an absolute majority, a largely uneventful 4 years can be expected with many deadlocks, as the gap within society is so wide that both sides would view any cooperation as a betrayal.
One thing is certain, though, whatever happens on the 12th of April, the sun will rise the next morning.